What belongs in a cryptographic inventory?
A cryptographic inventory records which algorithms a system uses, what they do and what supports each observation. It turns individual findings into a useful basis for technical decisions.
Start with the purpose
“We use AES” answers only part of the question. What information is protected, which component uses the algorithm, and how are keys supplied? An inventory should record the role of cryptography alongside algorithm names.
Encryption protects data confidentiality. Digital signatures help detect changes and associate a message with a signing key. Hash functions produce a digest of data; an ordinary hash neither encrypts data nor authenticates its sender. These functions require different assessments and migration paths.
Combine source code with operational evidence
Static analysis looks for recognisable patterns in source code without running the program. It can connect specific calls to a file and line. It cannot fully establish whether that code executes in production, which settings are loaded or what a remote peer negotiates.
You should therefore complement code findings with configurations, library versions, certificate inventories and suitable operational observations. Purchased services and devices should also be considered. For each observation, record its source and the area examined.
Make each entry actionable
A useful entry connects the technical finding with ownership and protection requirements. Document unknowns explicitly. A missing detail is a task to clarify, not evidence that no risk exists. For ICT service providers, it is also important to know which organisation can approve and roll out a change.
- Algorithm and role: encryption, signature, key exchange or hashing.
- Location, affected component, version and observation source.
- Responsible team, dependencies and required protection lifetime.
- Review date, coverage, open questions and next assessment step.
Use a CBOM to make the inventory reusable
A Cryptographic Bill of Materials, or CBOM, represents cryptographic assets in a structured form. CycloneDX can describe algorithms, keys, certificates and relationships to software components. The information actually available depends on the collection process and tool.
Preserve the link to the software version examined. Update the inventory after relevant changes and check whether different scans have the same scope. This allows development, security and operations to work from a shared basis. A CBOM organises knowledge; it replaces neither the review of an implementation nor a complete picture of the infrastructure.
Brief answers
Does an inventory prove that the cryptography is secure?
No. It documents what was identified. Parameters, key management, protocols and actual usage require separate assessment. Gaps in discovery still matter.
Should a CBOM contain private key values?
Suitable metadata and references are sufficient for inventory purposes. Secret key values should not be copied into a widely shared inventory report.
Avalanche Quantum finds supported cryptographic calls and key material in source code. Findings, risks and scan scope help you assess the recognised inventory. The CBOM export supports further work.
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